Thailand's Democracy 30 Years Later

Written 30 years ago, just after "Black Songkran" if you are keeping count. Remarkable constrasts and similarities. Results for that election are in the elections drop-down menu.

Thais to go through motion of a democratic election
Victoria Butler
17 April 1979
The Globe and Mail

Special to The Globe and Mail

BANGKOK - For the first time in three years the people of Thailand will be allowed to vote for some of their leaders in a general election scheduled for April 22.

Politicians, representing 15 different political parties, have been star attractions at mass rallies and afternoon luncheons. They stroll through their constituencies shaking hands and conduct evening seminars to explain democracy.

A lot of time, money and energy is being spent by more than 1,000 candidates competing for 301 seats in the lower house. But, as Kukrit Pramoj, a former premier and current candidate, humorously said, There is a spirit of fight in the air but against whom and for what no one seems to know.

In marked contrast to 1975, this election lacks excitement and zest. Moreover, it lacks a sense of purpose. In 1973 the military dictatorship of Thanom Kittikachorn was overthrown. Thais were prepared and determined to replace it with a government promising democratic reform. Instead, as many see it, they got an uneasy coalition government and a parliament riddled with internecine squabbling. In October, 1976, the mirage of democracy was shattered in a bloody coup.

After the 1976 coup, politicians were hobbled and hounded by the government of Tanin Kraivixien. Tanin didn't last either and in 1977 Gen. Kriangsak Chamanand, in yet another coup, imposed a more benign martial law on the country. History has had a sobering effect on both the candidates and the voters.

Several other factors have combined to rob the campaign of its piquancy. Most important, the question of power was decided long before the contestants entered the political fray. The constitution allows Gen. Kriangsak to appoint parliament's upper house, which will have powers virtually equal to those of the elected lower house on major issues.

Members from the upper and lower houses will jointly choose the next premier, who does not have to be an elected representative. It is thus virtually assured that Gen. Kriangsak, who is not a candidate, will return as premier. Summing up the paradox, a political scientist said, This whole exercise is a way to legitimize a military premier who has not submitted himself to an election. He added, The entire constitution was written for Kriangsak.

The candidates themselves have also unwittingly contributed to the generally flat tone of the election. Old soldiers from earlier electoral battles have emerged once again from Thailand's political demi-monde to lead their political parties.

The Thai press unkindly refers to them as dinosaurs. Although there are fewer parties this time around - 15 versus a previous 40 - there are practically no new faces. Remarked one analyst, The continuity in party leadership is remarkable.

For the most part the parties vied for candidates who were former MPs and who were certain of re-election. Ideology, as Kukrit openly admits, is of little importance.

To many Thais the continuity of leadership is not only remarkable, it is alarming. What, asked one businessman, will be the difference this time around. Many of them just want power and money for themselves and won't do anything for the country. Pessimistically he added, It will just be a bad rerun.

Thai Rath Toons

Another cartoon from Thai Rath

Who will clean up the mess?
--(paper) relations with neighboring countries
--debt/coalition partners
--corruption "Thai Strength" projects
--(kids) stop intervening in the media
--intervention in the police force
--without skill to fix the economy

Photo of the Day

He's from my neck of the woods, so I had to give him space. Not to mention that he is a former president. Bangkok Post

TI: Corruption Perception Index 2009

Here is a condensed list of the 2009 CPI rankings from Transparency International. The index was released on November 17, 2009.

• The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) table shows a country's ranking and score, the number of surveys used to determine the score, and the confidence range of the scoring.

• The rank shows how one country compares to others included in the index. The CPI score indicates the perceived level of public-sector corruption in a country/territory.

• The CPI is based on 13 independent surveys. However, not all surveys include all countries. The surveys used column indicates how many surveys were relied upon to determine the score for that country.

• The confidence range indicates the reliability of the CPI scores and tells us that allowing for a margin of error, we can be 90% confident that the true score for this country lies within this range.

Here is a user friendly interactive tool and a video briefing on the index by Huguette Labelle, Chair of Transparency International.



Transparency International

SR: Good point on large stimulus packages opening up new opportunities for corruption. It will be interesting to see if the Democrats are able to do anything about this, avoid their own officials from getting involved, checking coalition parties, and whether the media will have any interest in uncovering it given their known biases in favor of the current government. I suspect Abhisit is well aware of the corruption problem, but severely hampered in curbing it because it pervades nearly all aspects of the culture.

Thailand's past rankings:
2001-61; 2002-64; 2003-70; 2004-64; 2005-59; 2006-63; 2007-84; 2008-80; 2009-84

Rumors: Assassination, New Party, & Money

A few days back, a Thai Rath editorial reported a few eyebrow raising political rumors. The first rumor was Pracha Prasopdee’s (Puea Thai, Samut Prakan) public comment that there is a 150 million baht ($US 4.5 million) contract out for Thaksin’s head. In Pracha’s statement he said that the name of the contractor for the hit begins with the Thai letter that sounds like “s”. Thai Rath says,

"เด็ดหัว" ซะคนเดียว จะได้จบเรื่องกันไปฉะนั้นอย่าคิดว่าเป็นแค่คิว "เด็กเลี้ยงแกะ" โวยวายแหกตาชาวบ้าน กับข่าวไม่ได้กรองของนายประชา ประสพดี ส.ส.สมุทรปราการ โทรโข่งจอมตีปี๊บของเครือข่าย "นายใหญ่" เปิดปมแฉผู้บงการอักษร "ส"ตั้งค่าหัวล่าสังหารอดีตนายกฯทักษิณ 150 ล้านบาท

…โดยเกมป่วนที่มองกันว่า "นายใหญ่" พยายามป่วนฝ่ายคุมเกมอำนาจประเทศไทย เพื่อหวังกลับบ้าน ต้องคิดกันซะใหม่"ส" จ้องเอาตาย ยังไง "ทักษิณ" ก็ไม่กลับมาเป็นเป้าล่อกระสุนในเวลาอันใกล้แน่,

The second rumor is that Sudarat Keyuraphan—unofficial Puea Thai leader for Bangkok—may split and form her own political party. Her exit from the party could split the Thaksin camp.

โดยเกมลึกๆต้องอ่านทางจากเซียนเลือกตั้งจมูกไวตามข่าววงใน ล่าสุด "เจ๊หน่อย" คุณหญิงสุดารัตน์ เกยุราพันธุ์ เจ้าแม่เมืองหลวง ตั้งท่าจะอพยพไปตั้งพรรคการเมืองใหม่ นัยว่าขอแจมเฉพาะในเขตกรุงเทพฯ"เจ๊หน่อย" จะแหกค่ายนายใหญ่

Last but not least, there is the rumor of Suriya Jungrungreungkit—a former secretary-general of Thai Rak Thai and transport minister—talking with Thaksin’s ex-wife Potjaman. The editorial ends by saying that election watchers are listening carefully for news about the country’s biggest investors (capitalists) throwing money to political camps.

ในทางตรงกันข้ามกับอีกสายก็แว่วๆข่าวว่า นายสุริยะ จึงรุ่งเรืองกิจ อดีตเลขาธิการพรรคไทยรักไทย เริ่มหันกลับไปต่อสายพูดคุยกับคุณหญิงพจมาน ณ ป้อมเพชร อดีตภริยาของอดีตนายกฯทักษิณกระตุ้นสัญญาณรีเทิร์น ผนึกขุมกำลังพรรคเพื่อไทยอีกสายหนึ่งบรรดาเซียนเลือกตั้งขาใหญ่ ก็กำลังเงี่ยหูฟังข่าวมีนายทุนใหญ่ระดับประเทศกำลังปั่นโปรเจกต์ โยนเงินก้อนใหญ่ให้ตั้งค่ายการเมือง

SR: On the first rumor. Surprising? Not really. The anti-Thaksin contingent is extremely radicalized, which is probably an understatement. Reading commentary here and here it would not come as a surprise if someone offered to pony up the cash to whack the "evil one". There might also be other groups that share similar sentiment. While assassination attempts are not a daily occurrence, we have had the Sondhi Limthongkul attempt in April and with weak rule of law and sharp political divisions, the atmosphere is primed for such activities. Again, this is an unsubstantiated rumor from a member of the Thaksin-backed party—certainly self-serving motives to spread such a rumor exist. The letter “s” as the contractor, from both angles, is not surprising either. I’m sure everyone can think of at least a half dozen people that might fit this description.

Second rumor is interesting to hear. Sudarat was a prominent cabinet minister (health and agriculture) in the Thaksin government, so her name carries some political weight. Her involvement in TRT also places her on the long list of banned politicians. Sudarat and her family are well-banked (800+ million baht), putting them in a strong position to play politics. Is the rumor true? Well, there are a number of reasons to split from Puea Thai (bluff for more bargaining power, see no future for the party, personal reasons, etc) and an equal number of reasons for the anti-Puea Thai camp to make up the rumor to create division and paranoia inside Puea Thai.

A few notes on Suriya Jungrungreangkit:

• Former transport minister in the Thaksin government. As a former member of TRT, he has also had his official political rights suspended for five years.

• Owner of Thai Summit—a major supplier of auto parts to Toyota’s Thailand factories (Forbes, March 8, 2006)

• His family ranks as the country’s ninth richest by Forbes in 2008.

• Accused of corruption in July 2009 by Democrat Nakhon Nayok MP, Charnchai Issarasenarak. The Nation notes, “As deputy chairman of the House committee on anti-graft, he said the committee would ask the National Anti-Corruption Commission to check irregularities that took place in 2004 when Suriya Jungrungreangkit was transport minister and purchased 1,297 buses worth over Bt2 billion at highly inflated prices of from Bt2 to Bt6 million each. He could have bought each bus from Bt500,000 to Bt1 million at that time.

• Also accused of corruption in the purchase of security scanners at the Suvarnabhumi airport. Nation reports, “Everyone remembered a similar case two years ago, when the Justice Department implicated Thai politicians in a bribery scandal. That time, it involved the purchase of scanners for Suvarnabhumi Airport, and then-transport minister Suriya Jungrungreangkit came under a House no-confidence debate. We also remembered that Suriya made a narrow escape.”

Thai Rath Toons

c/o Thai Rath

Abhisit: Extradite..Bad guy come here..Don't make me angry!
Tiger: Bureaucratic Polity
Hun Sen: I don't throw friends to the tigers!

Siam Report also got a chuckle out of the Nation's report on Korbsak.

The monthly bill for all of this is around Bt2,000, but for that price he never misses a thing - even though he's reading newspapers less these days. Daily browsings of The Economist and Bloomberg News have been muscled aside in his schedule by Twitter, which Korbsak adores for bringing people closer.

Did Korbsak really say that about The Economist and Bloomberg News or did the journalist just make that part up. As readers are probably aware, both publications are for the most part deemed heretical in ultra right-wing circles. The Economist often challenges the dominant conservative paradigm propagated by the Thai elite, with certain articles seen as contravening Thai law--Lese Majeste. Similarly, Bloomberg News was recently targeted by the seemingly paranoid, conservative forces for its reporting on the health of the Thai king. According to these forces, Bloomberg undermined Thai national security by reporting on rumors of the king's health. Of all the news sources in the world, the journalist names the ones most hated within its own economic, political, and social milieu.

Have to agree on his last point,

The downside of the mobile's convenience is a decline in good manners, especially among teenagers, Korbsak says.

"When you take young people out to dinner they create their own personal worlds - they just keep texting messages and pay no attention to anyone at the table!"

Abhisit: Early Elections

The WSJ reports Abhisit saying he will call "early elections",

Thailand Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva said Saturday that he will likely call early elections after the economy has firmly recovered. "The likelihood is that there will be early elections once the economy is firmly grounded," Mr. Abhisit said on the sidelines of the annual summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. "The early poll could be called any time," he said, declining to specify a timeframe. Mr. Abhisit had been expected to wait until near the end of his term in late 2011, but calling for early polls would help legitimize the rule of a prime minister who was selected by Parliament, not through a popular mandate."

SR: Not sure if this is any different from before--both in style and meaning. The condition of "once the economy is firmly grounded" is ambiguous enough to allow the PM to change course at any time. If political conditions are not ripe for the Democrats, he can always say that the economy is not "firmly grounded" enough and continue to delay. In terms of style, Abhisit once again displays his mastery of the media sound bite.

If the polls are truly accurate, now may be the most opportune time for the Democrats to call elections. When will they role the dice? In Shawn Crispin's latest Asia Times piece, he says this on this issue,

Earlier, Abhisit had sought to keep a diplomatic lid on escalating tensions, but with the surge in opinion polls he enjoyed after downgrading bilateral relations he now arguably has political motivation in maintaining, if not ramping, tensions with Cambodia until elections are held next year. Abhisit's popularity nearly tripled last week, from 23.6% in September to 68.6%, according to a local ABAC poll. The surge in his approval ratings saw significant rises in the northern and northeastern regions where the Thaksin-aligned Peua Thai party holds sway.

The Democrats had earlier planned to hold elections coinciding with an expected strong economic upturn towards the middle of next year, but some analysts now wonder whether they will move that timetable forward in view of their recent gains in popularity over Thaksin's Cambodia gambit. The Democrats had, before downgrading Cambodian relations started planning for new polls, including a division of labor at the Prime Minister's Office with units dedicated separately to strategy, communications and administration, according to a diplomatic source familiar with the situation.

If Abhisit does decide to go ahead and dissolve the House, elections will then need to be held within 60 days, according to the 2007 Constitution. Section 108 of the Constitution says, "The King has the prerogative to dissolve the House of Representatives for new election of members of the House. Dissolution of the House of Representatives shall be made through a Royal Decree in which the day for new general election must be fixed within 60 days and the election date must be the same throughout the Kingdom. Dissolution of the House of Representatives may be made only once under the same circumstances."

Earlier, Abhisit said he wants the constitutional reform issue resolved before calling elections, in addition to economic recovery and political calm sufficient to allow for a peaceful election campaign. Will Abhisit take the big gambit and dissolve the House now that his popularity is at an all-time high, thanks to Thaksin's Cambodia gift?

Photo of the Day

c/o Matichon

Thaksin is thinking ______________.

Supporters are thinking ___________.

PAD/ASTV/Manager would say _____________.

You are thinking _______________.

Cambodian Membership in ASEAN

Siam Report mentioned in the last post that one in the laundry list of Hun Sen dislikes about the Democrat Party was the Democrat's position towards Cambodian membership in ASEAN. A brief look into this matter reveals that the Democrat-led government in 1998 did not support immediate entry of Cambodia into ASEAN because of concerns about political stability inside Cambodia! After reading about the situation, I could not help but feel an enormous sense of irony. Now, the tables have for the most part turned--Thailand is the country that is politically unstable (for more than three years), while Cambodia has become more stable. One can argue the hows and whys, but the bottom-line is that Thailand is a politically unstable country. Hypothetically, if Thailand was seeking membership into ASEAN today, could Hun Sen legitimately make the argument that Thailand is not ready for membership at this time because it is not politically stable, just as the Democrats argued when Cambodia was trying to join ASEAN?

Here is some of what was reported in the Bangkok Post back in December 1988,

Cambodia wants to join Asean. Most of the members of the trade bloc agree the timing is right, but Thailand has reservations. The Kingdom's failure to show enthusiasm for Cambodia's entry may do little to improve relations between touchy neighbours.

Thailand's demand for proof of political stability in Cambodia before it joins the Association of Southeast Asian Nations could lead to strained relations between the two countries. The insistence on the fulfillment of the deal between two previous rivals, Hun Sen and Prince Norodom Ranariddh, including the formation of a new government, underscores Thai concern about the possibility of another break-up of the government.

Cambodia, Singapore, and the Philippines wanted more from Cambodia before giving it membership,

The strategy for delaying Cambodia's Asean membership - possibly for another six months - has allied Thailand with Singapore, which questions the country's ability to fulfill commitments to Asean, and the Philippines, which is not satisfied with human rights problems there. Asean foreign ministers meet every July, with Singapore as the next host.

In talks due to begin during dinner last night, the three countries' foreign ministers have to convince supporters of Cambodia, which include Burma, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, and Vietnam, to change their stance. Brunei has not made clear its position.

A Thai decision to try and delay Cambodian entry could be perceived negatively in Phnom Penh, undermining trust--Bangkok Post continues,

Although Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan said on Wednesday that Thailand's stance on Cambodian membership of Asean was not meant to interfere with the country's internal affairs, membership is what Cambodian leaders have been promised, and Phnom Penh could view the Thai position differently.

Phnom Penh could see it as a bid by Thailand to block Cambodia's re-entry into the global community, and this could lead to a failure to trust Thailand's sincerity in boosting ties between the two countries.

The Democrat's handling of Cambodia policy vs. former PM Chavalit's,

Hun Sen has been gauging Thai policy towards Cambodia since Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai returned to power in November last year, succeeding Gen Chavalit Yongchaiyudh.

Unlike Gen Chavalit, who used his military ties to foster relations with Cambodia, the position of Mr Chuan and his Democrat-led coalition government is unclear to Phnom Penh.

With Hun Sen's party taking control of key ministries, including that of foreign affairs, the Thai stance on Asean membership for Cambodia could be met with irritation in Phnom Penh.

[There are a number of articles on this subject stored here]

At that December 1998 meeting of ASEAN in Hanoi, the group failed to reach consensus on Cambodia's entry into the grouping--they agreed to let Cambodia in but not the official timing (see last article in storage). Also, there is a recent video piece by Al Jazeera , interviewing Larry Jagan, in which he mentions the Cambodia-ASEAN entry issue. The situation is also deemed as silly, but dangerous!

There is no real excuse for either side to behave they way they are currently behaving. History is often a convenient excuse and rationalization to unjustifiably justify present actions. This post is not meant to point out the "historical incident" to justify Hun Sen's present actions, but just to suggest some explanation for why Hun Sen does not like to cooperate with the Abhisit government.

Thaksin: Cambodia-Thailand Extradition

It’s quite clear that Hun Sen is not going to extradite Thaksin back to Thailand. Bangkok Pundit notes that historical rivalry between Thailand and Cambodia, especially during the 80’s and 90’s, may provide some explanation for Hun Sen’s recalcitrance. Siam Report agrees with that assessment, and in furthering this analysis, I would like to point out a particular Thai-Cambodia extradition case in the late 1990’s that raised tensions between Hun Sen and the Democrat-led government at the time. This case has not received mention in the press, but after following the story, you can probably see why Hun Sen does not have much love for the Democrat Party of Thailand.

Before we get to that, let’s go way back in time and read more about the Cambodian strongman Hun Sen. [Be forewarned that this is a bit of a McDonald’s post—the customer will do much of the work—reading the stories and interpreting events through your own lenses.]

Who is Hun Sen? An article from September 1981 in the Globe and Mail describes the world's youngest foreign minister as,

Hun Sen understands the battlefield as well as most foreign ministers twice his age. He began his career 11 years ago in the jungles fighting for Pol Pot. Rising through the guerrilla ranks to become a regimental commander, he led his troops into Phnom Penh in 1975. The Khmer Rouge won, but the victory cost Hun Sen his left eye.

Pol Pot launched a savage social revolution, unleashing a bitter war with Vietnam. Worse, the regime steadily purged itself, executing thousands upon thousands of its cadres. Hun Sen defected to Vietnam in 1977.

There, he joined a group of Hanoi-trained Cambodians who had joined the Communist movement in the early 1950s. As disenchantment with Pol Pot grew, more Khmer Rouge fled to Vietnam throughout 1978.

They returned in Vietnamese tanks in 1979, backed by about 20,000 Vietnamese. Hun Sen, 28 at the time, was one of the leaders of the joint command that took Phnom Penh on Jan.7, 1979.

Hun Sen eventually went from foreign minister to leader of the entire country. Up until the late 1990's, he fought the remnants of the Khmer Rouge (KR) along the Thai-Cambodian border--the KR were unofficially supported by countries like Thailand, UK, China, and the United States, according to Asia Times sources,

Less critical focus has been given to the UN's credibility to oversee the trial. The UN gave the Khmer Rouge a seat on its General Assembly for 15 years after the regime's fall to Vietnamese forces in 1979. In that time, it also supported a Western-led trade embargo which stopped vital aid from moving into Cambodia and dealt a serious blow to the nation's economic development.

Observers have also questioned the US's role. Under former US president Ronald Reagan, financial and humanitarian assistance from the US to the Khmer Rouge grew. According to a 1998 edition of the US magazine Covert Action Quarterly, aid from the US’s Central Intelligence Agency and the government reached US$85 million by the end of the 1980s.

With the US still irked by its loss to communist forces in Vietnam, and China worried about Vietnamese expansionism in Southeast Asia, the two sides formed a bloc against Hanoi and the regime it installed in Phnom Penh. Khmer Rouge defectors told Australian journalist John Pilger that in the 1980s they were trained in Malaysia by British and American military advisors.

In the same Pilger report, an anonymous United Kingdom Ministry of Defense official told the Daily Telegraph at the time that Cambodia was "a classic Reagan and [former UK prime minister Margaret] Thatcher operation". Britain's Foreign Office's official response at the time was: "Britain does not give military aid in any form to the Cambodian factions".

Asia Times goes on to quote from former Singaporean president Lee Kuan Yew's memoirs,

China, as well as Singapore, gave covert military support to Pol Pot's jungle-based anti-government movement in the form of anti-tank weapons, mines and rifles in the years that followed the fall of the Khmer Rouge government in Phnom Penh. Meanwhile, the US, UK and neighboring Southeast Asian nations openly helped the insurgents diplomatically and with food aid.

Singapore's former prime minister Lee Kuan Yew said in his memoirs that as much as US$1.3 billion was spent by China, the US, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand in support of the Khmer Rouge and other Cambodian rebels fighting the Vietnamese and allied government forces. American, Singaporean, Malaysian and Thai officials held regular meetings in Bangkok to coordinate the Cambodian aid program, Lee wrote in From Third World to First: The Singapore Story 1965-2000.

He said the Singapore representative "estimated that the United States dispensed a total of about $150 million in covert and overt aid to the non-communist groups, Singapore $55 million, Malaysia $10 million and Thailand a few million in training, ammunition, food and operational funds".

By 1998, the Khmer Rouge resistance had effectively exhausted itself--most of its soldiers had already defected to the government or were in the process, while those remaining hardliners were ageing and headed into retirement--Pol Pot died in April 1998 in Anglong Veng, a KR run district along the Thai border. Nate Thayer, a Cambodia expert and legendary former FEER journalist, notes,

Besieged in dense jungles along the Thai border, the remnants of the Khmer Rougeare battling for survival in the wake of three weeks of chaotic defections and the loss of their northern stronghold of Anlong Veng. Having lost faith in the harsh leadership of Ta Mok, several commanders are negotiating to defect to the guerrilla forces loyal to deposed Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh.

Ta Mok's growing paranoia and isolation were only some of the revelations to comeout of an exclusive tour of shrinking Khmer Rouge-held territory north of Anlong Veng the day after Pol Pot's death. Khmer Rouge cadres and Pol Pot's wife recounted the last, ignominious days of his life, as he was moved through the jungle to escape advancing troops.

Meanwhile, Hun Sen had become the strongman of Cambodia, Thayer continues,

He was a Khmer Rouge military officer in the 1970s, and became the prime minister of Cambodia's communist government in the 1980s. Observers may have expected Hun Sen's rise to stall, however, when his Cambodian People's Party lost the United Nations-run elections in 1993. Instead -- five years, three coups, hundreds of politically motivated killings and a questionable election later -- he appears to be in complete control.

After losing the 1993 election, Hun Sen refused to accept the result and ordered out the military, forcing a power-sharing arrangement with the victorious Funcinpec party. Like the expert chess player that he is, he has methodically -- and often brutally -- outmanoeuvered all his challengers since. He forced out competition within his CPP, and created a large personal army to spearhead attacks against critics, culminating in his coup d'etat in July 1997.

When the international community balked, he threatened to overrun embassies with pro-government protesters, kick out the UN, and withdraw Cambodia's request to join Asean. The July 1998 elections failed to give him the majority he needed to form a government alone, forcing him to negotiate with opposition leaders. When that failed to produce a coalition, he banned elected parliamentarians from leaving the country and threatened opposition leaders with arrest. In the end, the opposition essentially gave up. A new government with a five-year mandate and Hun Sen in the top job was expected to be formed soon.

It was also in 1998 that Cambodia made its way towards ASEAN membership, something that Thailand's Democrat-led government had unofficially opposed. According to FEER,

Cambodia's admission to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations has proven almost as tortuous a process as the long and still-not-assured process of bringing peace and stability to the country. In the run-up to the December 15-16 Asean summit in Hanoi, it seemed likely that newly installed Prime Minister Hun Sen would fail in his bid to become the 10th and final member of the association. Singapore was strongly opposed, as was Thailand and the Philippines: Their diplomats needed convincing that the new government in Phnom Penh was stable. But a surprise was in store.

This finally brings us to the extradition case of Sok Yoeun, a Cambodian accused of trying to assassinate Hun Sen in September 1998. Hun Sen blamed Sok Yoeun and members of the opposition for the rocket attack on his convoy, while the opposition argued that Hun Sen staged the attack to discredit and clampdown on their party. In the reported assassination attempt, three of the rockets failed to go off and a fourth missed the motorcade but hit a village house, killing a child and severely injuring another three people. The suspects in the attack fled and eventually crossed over into Thailand. Hun Sen responded, nearly a year later, by demanding the Thai side extradite Sok Yoeun. Reuters reports,

Cambodian premier Hun Sen said on Wednesday an opposition party activist accused of involvement in an alleged plot to kill him should be sent back from Thailand where he has sought United Nations protection. Hun Sen said Cambodia and Thailand have an extradition treaty and anyone who protected Sok Yoeun, an activist from the opposition Sam Rainsy Party, would be branded a "terrorist".

Sok Yoeun recently fled to Thailand after police named him in connection with the case. Hun Sen said the man was being looked after by the local office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), but that he should not be considered a political refugee.

"We have an extradition treaty...and there's no reason for Thailand and the UNHCR to consider that person a political refugee," Hun Sen told reporters when asked if his government would seek the man's return.

Then everything gets messy. Thai domestic politics comes into play, which means Chavalit and the Democrat Party are at loggerheads. In a censure debate that year, Chavalit revealed that Sok Yoeun was in the country under UNHCR cover. The revelation was meant to discredit the Democrats, who apparently had no idea that Sok Yoeun was in Thailand. As expected, the Thai English language press went for Chavalit's throat--Veera at the Bangkok Post said, "The controversy he had stirred to discredit the government had blown up in his face. Gen Chavalit's credibility was further eroded and there even have been questions whether he is sound enough mentally to head the opposition, let alone captain the ship of state. " In the "blown up in his face" part Veera was making reference to the Democrats attempt to turn the tables on Chavalit by showing his links to the Sok Yoeun affair--the Dem's story was that Sok Yoeun had been forced to confess by Suwan Puti, who was connected with Pol Lt-Col Adul Boonset, a close aide to Chavalit Yongchaiyudh. After the censure revelation, PM Chuan said that Thailand would extradite him, but this commitment came into question when Chuan said he should be sent to a third country, along with other conditions. The Hun Sen camp, some might say, perceived these various conditions as an attempt to protect Sok Yoeun from extradition. Next, Thai military TV aired a clip of Sok Yoeun confessing to the planned attack on Hun Sen--Sok Yoeun and his supporters said the confession was forced. Then in another twist, Thai authorities arrested Sok Yoeun for illegal entry and sent him to jail for six months (the whole ordeal would last many years more).

After his release, Sok Yoeun was immediately detained again to face the Cambodian extradition request. By February 2001, the Democrats were out and Thaksin and the Thai Rak Thai were in. On the election of the new government and the Sok Yoeun case, the Nation said the case would serve as a litmus test for bilateral relations,

Another problem affecting relations is the Cambodian fugitive, Sok Yoeun, wanted for an attempted assassination of Cambodian premier Hun Sen, who is in Thai custody.

When Sok Yoeun was arrested in 1999, Phnom Penh submitted an extradition request. But Thailand insisted that a Thai court would have a final say about his future.

Cambodia, therefore, regards this issue as a litmus test of bilateral relations, even as the international community supports Sok Yoeun's denial of the charges. The ball is now on Thailand's side of the net in that a Thai court will have to rule in favour of one side or the other.

In March 2001, Thailand and Cambodian ratified their extradition treaty, AFP reports,

Cambodia and Thailand ratified an extradition treaty Thursday in a move which Phnom Penh hopes will lead to Bangkok handing over a man accused of an assassination attempt on Prime Minister Hun Sen.

Cambodian Foreign Minister Hor Namhong said the treaty, which will come into effect in 30 days, would make it possible for Thailand to extradite Sok Yoeun who is currently being held in a Thai jail.

"This treaty will come into force within 30 days after the signing of this exchange of ratification protocols. So it depends on the Thai court to decide on the issue," he said, adding that Phnom Penh saw Sok Yoeun as a terrorist.

On November 28, 2002, the Thai courts ordered the extradition of Sok Yoeun, ruling that the Cambodian extradition request involved a non-political crime. Sok Yoeun appealed the ruling but the court upheld the original judgment. Sok Yoeun then went back to Cambodia were he was executed, right? Wrong. Hun Sen, the consummate politician, decided to drop the extradition request and allow Sok Yoeun to travel to Finland to reside with the rest of his family. In doing so, Hun Sen could project himself as a kind and forgiving person in contrast to the common media portrayal of him as a cruel, brutal third world strongman. Finally, on February 26, 2004, Sok Yoeun left Bangkok for Finland, ending his four year and three month political and legal affair.

[All the news articles for the Sok Yoeun saga have been stored here]

As for what this case has to do with the present, I think an argument can be made that Thailand's initial delay in extradition of Sok Yoeun, while the Democrat Party was in power, was not lost on Hun Sen when he heard Abhisit demand the extradition of one of his own political opponents. Thailand eventually did order the extradition, but the timing was interesting in that it went down during the Thaksin administration. Also, interesting to read about Democrat obstruction of Cambodia's admission to ASEAN (though some progress in relations seems to have been made at the end of their term with the 2000 MoU, which was recently revoked--in the articles you can read about this).

Whether the Democrats intentionally tried to delay the whole process, via arresting Sok Yoeun for illegal entry, trying to hide his presence through UNHCR, is all irrelevant. What matters is how Hun Sen preceived the actions of the Democrat government. Overall, Hun Sen's dislike for Abhsit and the Democrat-led government and his decision not to accept the Thaksin extradition request is likely based on an long accumulation of statements and actions and not just the Sok Yoeun case. Nevertheless one can't help but wonder if Hun Sen was thinking about this when he dismissed the Thai request for Thaksin's extradition. In his Bangkok Post interview--translated from Matichon--Hun Sen gives the impression that he is not at all fond of Abhisit--seeing him as young and unseasoned--and still incensed by Thailand's support of the KR in the 80's and 90's.