Thaksin in Cambodia

SR: Thaksin recently noted, "What were your mistakes?
I did politics without understanding the power structure of Thai society that much. I just tried to do it like a businessman, tried to do the marketing and campaigning and sales. I tried to help the poor and campaign for popularity, campaign on what I have done for them and work hard for them without being aware of the complication of the power structure of Thai politics. I was very naïve in that. So I stumbled. "*

Do his recent decisions to side with extremely unpopular persons, Hun Sen being one, represent similar "mistakes" in strategy? Thaksin says marketing is his strong point--I'm confused about his current branding strategy. Are these issues unimportant among the Thaksin-Puea Thai support base? Is their love for the big boss unconditional?

I have a grand conspiracy to explain all of this, but it is so outrageous that I'll keep it in the bag for now.

Abhisit's Popularity Jumps 45%

Is the enemy of my enemy really my friend? This is the question Thaksin and leaders of the Reds might be asking themselves if they believe the methodology and conclusions of a new ABAC poll. According to the poll, popular support for the Abhisit government has soared over 45% since its last poll on September 19th. Time to dissolve the House and call a snap election if you’re a Democrat, right?

The Nation, in its usual, overtly partisan rhetoric, says, “The popularity rating of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva tripled after his decisive action of downgrading diplomatic ties with Cambodia, according to an ABAC poll survey released yesterday.” The paper then draws its own causal links between the poll results and factors driving the change, “Factors attributing to the rise in popularity include the sentiment against Cambodia's attack on the Thai judicial system and concern over the consequences of the Cambodians' appointment of fugitive ex-premier Thaksin Shinawatra as an adviser.”

Why the massive jump in support?

Siam Report presents the poll findings below with follow up analysis. The translation is my own. If someone finds anything faulty, which would drastically alter the interpretation of the findings, please leave a comment.

Methodology: Base of public support for Abhisit government after the international political conflict with Cambodia. The survey sampled 3,709 people over 18, covering 21 provinces around the country, from October 25 to November 5. The survey found that 81.1% of respondents were aware of Hun Sen’s interview in which he “attacked” the Thai judicial system.

ดร.นพดล กรรณิกา ผู้อำนวยการสำนักวิจัยเอแบคโพลล์ มหาวิทยาลัยอัสสัมชัญ เปิดเผย ผลวิจัยเชิงสำรวจ เรื่อง ฐานสนับสนุนของสาธารณชนต่อรัฐบาลนายอภิสิทธิ์ เวชชาชีวะ ภายหลังความ ขัดแย้งทางการเมืองระหว่างประเทศกับ กัมพูชา กรณีศึกษาตัวอย่างประชาชนที่มีอายุ 18 ปีขึ้นไปใน 21 จังหวัดของประเทศ ประกอบด้วย กรุงเทพมหานคร สมุทรปราการ ลพบุรี ชลบุรี สระแก้ว ยโสธร ศรีสะเกษ ขอนแก่น อุดรธานี สกลนคร หนองคาย น่าน เชียงใหม่ เชียงราย พิษณุโลก สมุทรสาคร กาญจนบุรี สุราษฎร์ธานี นครศรีธรรมราช ยะลา และ นราธิวาส จำนวนทั้งสิ้น 3,709 ตัวอย่าง ดำเนินโครงการระหว่างวันที่ 25 ตุลาคม — 5 พฤศจิกายน 2552 ผลการสำรวจพบว่า ส่วนใหญ่กว่าร้อย ละ 81.1 ทราบข่าวกรณีผู้นำประเทศกัมพูชาให้สัมภาษณ์โจมตีกระบวนการยุติธรรมภายในประเทศไทย

Respondents:
--52.8% female and 47.2% male
--7.1% (over 21), 20.8% (20-29), 25.5% (30-9), 24.7% (40-49), 21.9% (Over 50)
--71.7% less than bachelor’s degree, 28.3% bachelor’s or higher
--39.3% farmer/for-hire, 23.9% trader/private business, 14.5% office worker/private, 9.0% state official, 6.3% student, 7.0% homemaker/unemployed

จากการพิจารณาลักษณะทั่วไปของตัวอย่าง พบว่า ตัวอย่าง ร้อยละ 52.8 เป็นหญิง ร้อยละ 47.2 เป็นชาย ตัวอย่าง ร้อยละ 7.1 อายุต่ำกว่า 20 ปี ร้อยละ 20.8 อายุระหว่าง 20 — 29 ปี ร้อยละ 25.5 อายุระหว่าง 30 — 39 ปี ร้อยละ 24.7 อายุระหว่าง 40 — 49 ปี และร้อยละ 21.9 อายุ 50 ปีขึ้นไป ตัวอย่าง ร้อยละ 71.7 สำเร็จการศึกษาต่ำกว่าปริญญาตรี รองลงมาคือร้อยละ 28.3สำเร็จการศึกษาระดับปริญญาตรีขึ้นไป ตัวอย่าง ร้อยละ 39.3 ระบุอาชีพเกษตรกร/รับจ้างทั่วไป ร้อยละ 23.9 ระบุอาชีพค้าขาย/ธุรกิจส่วนตัว ร้อยละ 14.5 ระบุอาชีพพนักงานบริษัทเอกชน ร้อยละ 9.0 ระบุข้าราชการ/พนักงานรัฐวิสาหกิจ ร้อยละ 6.3 เป็นนักเรียน/นักศึกษา ร้อยละ 7.0 เป็นแม่บ้าน/พ่อบ้าน/เกษียณอายุ และว่างงาน

Results:
1. Aware of Hun Sen’s interview in which he attacked the fairness of the Thai judicial system.
--81.1%, yes
--18.9%, no

2. Support the current Abhisit government.
--Support, 23.3% (Sept. 19th), 68.6% (Nov. 6th)
-- Don't support, 11.5% (Sept. 19th), 21.1% (Nov. 6th)
-- Neutral, 65.2% (Sept. 19th ), 10.3% (Nov. 6th)

3. Support the current Abhisit government by gender.
--Support, 67.0% male, 70.1% female
--Don't support, 24.4% male, 18.0% female
--Neutral, 8.6% male, 11.9% female

4. Support the current Abhisit government by age.

(less 20), (20 — 29), (30 — 39), (40 — 49), (over 50)

Support 66.9, 68.4, 67.9, 68.0, 71.1

Don't support 9.3, 19.3, 21.4, 22.4, 22.6

Neutral 13.8, 12.3, 10.7, 9.6, 6.3

5. Support the current Abhisit government by income per month in baht.

<5000, 5001—10000, 10001—15000, 15001—20000, >20000

Support 66.5, 72.1, 72.6, 73.4, 72.3

Don't support 22.2, 19.4, 20.1, 20.2, 22.9

Neutral 11.3, 8.5, 7.3, 6.4, 4.8

5. Support the current Abhisit government by region.
เหนือ (North) กลาง (Central) อีสาน(Isan) ใต้ (South) กรุงเทพฯ (BKK) สนับสนุนรัฐบาล

Support 64.6, 68.9, 53.1, 88.2, 68.8

Don't Support 22.1, 22.1, 29.9, 4.4, 16.8

Neutral 13.3, 9.0, 17.0, 7.4, 14.4

SR: In fairness to the Nation, it looks like they have translated the ABAC poll director’s analysis of the results (last paragraph on ABAC site before results). Now the question is why they don’t examine the poll’s methodology as well as its assumptions. I think the answer to this question should be obvious to readers who regularly follow Thai politics and the Nation’s reporting of it.

The poll results suggest a seismic shift in opinion in support of the government—the fence-sitters have now moved decidedly in favor of Abhisit. It sounds too good to be true, which leaves me a little skeptical about the methodology and results. It was not but two weeks ago that ABAC posted a poll (see BP) showing Thaksin ahead of Abhisit in the question of who should be PM, and questions on Chavalit and Cambodia showed almost split opinion.

While such a huge shift is possible, SR is not thoroughly convinced about the results. SR wonders if an apples for apples comparison can be made using two surveys that are not identical in format? Difference in survey questions and question ordering can affect outcomes and make any comparison between two poll results suspect, which would make any causation/correlation claims questionable as well. In the recent poll, respondents are asked if they have heard about the Hun Sen interview in which he attacks Thailand’s judicial system. The immediate follow up question is do you support the current Abhisit government. Here is the potential problem with question ordering. Is the pollster tainting/leading the respondents' answer to the second question with the first question? The first question could lead the respondent to think that the second question is related to the first—that is, do you support the Abhisit government against Hun Sen’s attack? If this is the case—or partially the case—we cannot draw the conclusion that overall support for the Abhisit government has increased, which is what the Nation’s claim looks like. It is possible that the Nation has confused public support for Abhisit against Hun Sen with public support for entire government. The public might support Abhisit against Hun Sen, but not support its other performances or support it against Thaksin’s Puea Thai in an election.

So, has the intensifying diplomatic row between Thailand and Cambodia really been this much of a political boon for the Abhisit government? SR thinks it has been a partial boon (see concerns about the poll methodology above) and Thaksin might be making yet another strategic blunder by aligning with one of the country’s traditional adversaries, Cambodia and Hun Sen. Chavalit’s maneuvering with Hun Sen before APEC worked well, but now Thaksin may have become the victim of his own game. Thaksin must know how easy it is for segments of the Thai elite to rally public opinion (which could include Thaksin’s own supporters) against countries like Cambodia, Myanmar, and Vietnam—why would he want to advance the perception that he is working for the enemy? The Abhisit government was botching Cambodia policy on its own accord, but by accepting the position as an economic advisor to Hun Sen, Thaksin has given the government and its backers more ammunition to portray him as a real traitor. It’s now quite easy for the government to hide their own policy failures with Cambodia and blame everything on Thaksin and Hun Sen. Perhaps Thaksin is trying to bait the government into a massive overreaction, so that bilateral relations completely crash and burn. This might just be what happens, but it’s unclear whether Thaksin will gain from this outcome. Besides, Thaksin can win this game other ways with far less risk to himself and his supporters. From SR’s view, Thaksin’s strategy should not include outrageous provocations that could easily backfire, but just keep up steady pressure on the government and keep red shirts active. If history is any lesson, the Democrat government will self-destruct through monumental incompetence, corruption, infighting, and ultra-conservative/nationalistic zealotry. Let the Democrats do the work for you. It requires much less effort and much less risk.

Thai Rath Toons

Surprise ASEAN!
Thai Rath

Newin's Kabuki Theater

It’s not as tantalizing as the Abhisit vs. Hun Sen-Chavlit-Thaksin drama or the 4-country opening ceremony “no-show” for the ASEAN Summit held at the resort town turned garrison state, Hua Hin, but it’s interesting nonetheless and makes for good weekend cannon fodder. Newin Chidchob, the behind the scenes leader of Bhum Jai Thai party and the man who infamously ditched Thaksin’s party to give Abhisit and the Democrats sufficient numbers to form the current government, has recently been appointed by Bhum Jai Thai interior minister, Chaovarat Chanvirakul, to head a committee responsible for organizing Bhumibol’s 82nd birthday celebration on December 5th, according to Matichon.

คำสั่งตั้งนายเนวิน ชิดชอบ เป็นหัวหน้าคณะทำงานจัดกิจกรรม เฉลิมพระเกียรติ พระบาท สมเด็จพระเจ้าอยู่หัว เนื่องในโอกาสมหามงคลเฉลิม พระชนมพรรษา 82 พรรษา 5 ธันวาคม 2552 ที่นายชวรัตน์ ชาญวีรกูล รัฐมนตรีว่าการกระทรวงมหาดไทย ลงนามแต่งตั้งเมื่อวันที่ 22 ตุลาคมที่ผ่านมานั้น ทำให้นายเนวินที่อยู่หลังฉากมานาน กลับออกมายืนแถวหน้า โดยทำหน้าที่รับผิดชอบกำหนดรูปแบบ แนวทาง แผนงาน โครงการ ที่ลานพระราชวังดุสิต ให้เป็นไปด้วยความเรียบร้อยและสมพระเกียรติ พูดง่ายๆ ว่าเป็นผู้กำหนด แผนการจัดกิจ กรรมทั้งหมด ที่จะมีการจัดขึ้นที่ลานพระบรมรูปทรงม้า

Matichon notes that it’s not strange to see Newin in charge of the operation; after all, it is Newin who sobbingly told reporters after his acquittal in the rubber saplings corruption case that he would from now on “do everything to protect the monarchy, up until his last breath.” In addition, we should not be surprised if we see images come out to make people think Newin is loyal, different from the other side—Thaksin—whose loyalty has been questioned.

นายเนวินได้เดินออกมาจากห้องพิจารณาคดี พร้อมให้สัมภาษณ์สื่อมวลชน ด้วย เสียงสั่นเครือและน้ำตาคลอเบ้า "สำหรับตัวผมเอง นับจากวันนี้ไป ก็คงเหลือเรื่องเดียว จะทำทุกสิ่งทุกอย่างเพื่อปกป้องสถาบันพระมหากษัตริย์จนกว่าจะสิ้นลมหายใจ"ดังนั้น อาจจะไม่แปลกที่การจัดงาน "วันพ่อ 5 ธันวาคม" จะมีนายเนวินเป็นแม่งาน และไม่แปลกหากภาพที่จะออกมาแสดง จะทำให้คนมองว่านายเนวิน มีความจงรักภักดี ต่างจากฝ่ายตรงข้าง อย่าง พ.ต.ท.ทักษิณ ชินวัตร ที่ถูกตั้งคำถามความจงรักภักดี

Matichon concludes that every time Newin goes down the political road it’s not normal—flashy political game “ความเก๋าเกมการเมือง“ (feel free to help is you a better translation of that)—sometimes creating suspicion for his own group. But everything you see—a person named—Newin—has setup the plan from the beginning.

สำหรับนายเนวินทุกจังหวะการก้าวเดินบนถนนการเมืองย่อมไม่ธรรมดา ด้วย "ความเก๋าเกมการเมือง" จนบางครั้งสร้างความหวาดระแวงให้พวกเดียวกันแต่ทุกอย่างที่เห็น คนชื่อเนวินได้จัดวางขึ้นมาตั้งแต่ต้นแล้ว

SR: One could take a dark, cynical view that this is political kabuki theater at its finest. In this act of the play, Newin shrewdly uses political circumstances to rehabilitate his fractured public image—which has been tarred by his past attachments to various banking, vote-buying, and public procurement scandals, among others. Newin’s tears and his involvement in “special event organization” is nothing more than a coldly calculated re-branding effort to make himself more palatable for public consumption while paving over past “misconceptions” about his character. The opposite take, which gives Newin full benefit of the doubt, is that he is absolutely sincere in his convictions and commitment to do everything until his last breath—there is no hidden agenda to reap political benefits by attaching oneself to the monarchy. SR tends to take a mixed view, believing Newin has a strong personal attachment to the king and monarchy, as most Thais do, but who is also keenly aware of its power and position in society and the positive externalities that come from supporting and associating oneself with it. Whether Newin will ever be able to overcome his image as a corrupt and conniving political backstabber remains to be seen.

However you decide to assess Newin’s character—crude opportunist or noble public and royal servant—Newin will likely play a big role in how the political landscape develops as we move forward. At the moment, Newin’s Bhum Jai Thai party has the power to pull the plug on the Abhisit government at any moment, though that doesn't look likely for now since Bhum Jai Thai doesn’t have another big party to latch onto as well as the fact that it accrues various “benefits” from government projects such as the 4,000 LNG bus scheme and numerous Thai Strength projects linked to the government’s stimulus program. When the next election arrives, earlier speculated as middle of next year but now with rumors that it could be later or even at the end of the term, Newin’s party will likely play a leading role in the next government’s formation and maintain control over key ministries as it does today (commerce, transport and communications, ICT—the positive or negatives effects which this has on the overall Thai economy is certainly worth consideration). Again, thanks to huge government project money (which theoretically influences voters and mysteriously gives parties an election “war-chest”), Bhum Jai Thai may be able to protect or even expand its influence as we move closer to elections.

However, it is not at all a certainty that Bhum Jai Thai will still boast the same number of MPs after elections as it does now, given the drubbing it took from Puea Thai in the June Sisaket and Sakhon Nakhon by-elections. These two by-elections showed Thaksin’s continuing influence in the Northeast—voters can’t be swayed as easily as Newin may have thought. Does the bond between Thaksin and his voters last forever or will it diminish over time?

Lastly, it would come as no surprise if a major corruption scandal involving Bhum Jai Thai breaks out as government stimulus money makes its way through their channels—we have already seen cases of this in the public health ministry and other projects connected to the sufficiency economy program—though Democrat officials are said to be responsible for these episodes. The point here is that a corruption scandal, of significant magnitude, could potentially damage Newin and his party’s image, undermining the party’s electoral prospects (whether Buriram locals care about corruption is debatable). It could also have fallout on the Democrat's image and play into the hands of Sondhi Limthongkul’s New Politics party—who will likely compete for Democrat voters. Earlier, the timing of the next election, according to Abhisit, was contingent on a number of factors, but I would now add in an additional factor—related to the 16th floor, which may given reason to extend things until the end of the term if possible.

Militarization of Puea Thai

Gen. Chavalit Yongchaiyudh’s (a.k.a. Big Jiew-บิ๊กจิ๋ว) recent decision to join Puea Thai brought a public response; call it a rebuke, from Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda (a.k.a. Pa-ป๋า). Speaking at the Army officer club, with six commanders from the military branches behind him, Prem said he had sent someone to tell Chavalit to think carefully about his decision to join Puea Thai; otherwise it could be a betrayal of the country (see BP post here). Prem insists that he and Chavalit are still friends, but the statement makes it quite clear that relations between these two old “friends” are not as solid as they used to be.

Matichon has published an article covering the “Pa-Jiew” saga, as well as other important political developments.

On the “Pa-Jiew” drama, Matichon says news from “Friends of Chavalit—FOC” camp is that the “owner of Si Sao Thewet—Prem” did not allow “Pau Yai—Chavalit” to meet him in order to bring flowers and cloth, asking forgiveness before ordaining as a monk on the 20th of May 2009, in Chiang Mai. The response from the Prem camp is that he had no idea that Chavalit had decided to ordain as a monk. However, there is news (likely from FOC) that Chavalit did contact Prem through Gen. Pachun Thamprateep, chief of the Office of Privy Council President. Matichon notes that Prem might still be irritated that Chavalit chose to return and help Thaksin during the Somachai Wongsuwat government.

โดยเฉพาะการปล่อยข่าวผ่านเครือข่าย "เอฟโอซี" (เฟรนด์ ออฟ ชวลิต) ว่า "เจ้าของบ้านสี่เสาเทเวศร์" ไม่ยอมให้ "พ่อใหญ่ลา" เข้าพบเพื่อนำพานพุ่มดอกไม้แพรไป ขออโหสิกรรม ก่อนเข้าอุปสมบทที่วัดพระธาตุศรีจอมทองวรวิหาร อ.จอมทอง จ.เชียงใหม่ เมื่อวันที่ 20 พฤศจิกายน 2551 ด้วยเพราะยังเคืองที่ "บิ๊กจิ๋ว" วกกลับไปช่วยงาน "นายใหญ่" ในยุครัฐบาล "สมชาย วงศ์สวัสดิ์"ตรงนี้ทำให้ "บุรุษผมขาว" ถูกมองว่าไม่เป็นผู้ใหญ่ร้อนถึงผู้ถูกวิจารณ์ต้องตั้งโพเดียมแก้ต่างเมื่อวันที่ 15 ตุลาคมที่ผ่านมา โดยระบุว่าไม่ เคยทราบว่า "บิ๊กจิ๋ว" จะไปบวชที่ไหน เมื่อไร โดยมี "นายทหารลูกป๋า" 6 คนคอยยืนให้ กำลังใจอยู่เบื้องหลัง อย่างไรก็ตาม มีข่าวว่า "พ่อใหญ่ลา" ได้ติดต่อขอขมา "ป๋า" จริง โดยประสานงานผ่าน "พล.ร.อ.พะจุณณ์ ตามประทีป" หัวหน้าสำนักงานประธาน องคมนตรีและรัฐบุรุษ

SR: It is easy to see how Prem would still be upset about Chavalit helping Thaksin—it is Thaksin’s red shirts after all that protested at Prem’s residence accusing him of masterminding the 2006 coup, and demanding he resign as Privy Council president. Chavalit is also a former Prem loyalist. Prem, indeed, has every right to call anyone out he wants, including Chavalit—as it’s clearly written into the-ir 2007 Constitution. However, in doing so, some outsiders say Prem has done a disservice to himself and “others” by directly participating in the dirty sport of political mud wrestling. The Council, according to this group, is a reflection of the institution, which doesn’t involve itself in politics.

So, Chavalit has ignored the warning and joined a legally registered political party, which perhaps ironically is called Puea Thai (for Thai). What possible conclusions are we to draw about this move and his decision to travel to Cambodia at the time of Prem’s statements—Chavalit went to Cambodia with close friend, Gen. Wichit Yathip, in order to meet with PM Hun Sen (certainly a lot of time was spent “plotting”). These are certainly not things a good Thai would do, right?

Also in the Matichon piece was coverage of retired Gen. Jiradet Kocharat’s decision to hop aboard the Puea Thai express. Here is a summarized translation of that portion.

Finally, “Big Jauk—บิ๊กจ๊อก” Gen. Jiradet Kotcharat (class 9), former deputy Army commander-in-chief, who just retired on the 30th of September, 2009—was living as a normal citizen, but not for long.

He has chosen as auspicious moment to start down the “political road”—fully affiliating with Puea Thai party, which has “Pau Yai Jiew” (Gen. Chavalit Yongchaiyut), former PM.

Previously, Gen. Jiradet remained up in the air on which party to join or whether to establish a new political party with a “group of friends”, especially those closely related to Somsak Thepsuthin, a former Thai Rak Thai executive.

But in the end, “Big Jauk” chose to join Puea Thai, which is the political party considered “enemy number one” by the military—always.

What prompted the high-ranking soldier, who was deputy commander-in-chief, and one part of the “military coup” on September 19, 2006—during which he held the position of deputy commander of army area 3—before rising to area 3 commander—replacing Saprang Kalayanamitr (Class 7—Saprang ended up as deputy secretary in the defense ministry).

One possibility is that Jiradet has close relations with “Pau Yai Jiew”, which has looked after all of Class 9 for a long time—especially leaders like “Big Bae-บิ๊กแป๊ะ”, Gen. Wichit Yathip—former deputy commander-in-chief and big brother in Class 9. [note above that Chavalit traveled to Cambodia with Wichit]

It also means that Gen. Jitadet is a close Class 9 mate of Wichit, making this decision “click”—not so difficult.

Since Wichit and Chavalit were invited to work with Puea Thai—it’s therefore not strange that Jiradet accepted—because he is linked with political circles in the north—“Thaksin era”

One reason is Jiradet looks at the political future—if he chooses “Pakmaetaranibeeppom” [code word for Democrats?], it could make it difficult to be big in politics. And a “close person” has mentioned that he doesn’t know what the Democrats are doing—even with the military they cannot win an election, and in governing the country they don’t have anything good to offer the people.

These are probably the reasons that led Jiradet to stand on the side opposite of the military (“Pauk Era—ยุคน้องป๊อก”—Gen. Anupong Paochinda, commander-in-chief), going the path of politics indeed.

ในที่สุด "บิ๊กจ๊อก" พล.อ.จิรเดช คชรัตน์ อดีตรองผู้บัญชาการทหารบก ที่เพิ่งเกษียณอายุราชการไปหมาดๆ เมื่อวันที่ 30 กันยายน 2552 ผ่านการใช้ชีวิตแบบ "ประชาชนเต็มขั้น" ไปได้ไม่นานได้ฤกษ์เปิดตัวเข้าสู่ "ถนนสายการเมือง" แบบเต็มตัวด้วยการเข้าสังกัดพรรคเพื่อไทยที่มี "พ่อใหญ่จิ๋ว" พล.อ.ชวลิต ยงใจยุทธ อดีตนายกรัฐมนตรี เป็นหัวเรือกู้วิกฤตแม้ว่าเดิม พล.อ.จิรเดชจะยัง "ชั่งใจ" อยู่ว่าจะเข้าพรรคการเมืองใดดี หรือจะตั้ง พรรคการเมืองใหม่กับ "กลุ่มพ้องเพื่อน" โดยเฉพาะความสนิทชิดเชื้อ กับนายสมศักดิ์ เทพสุทิน อดีตกรรรมการบริหารพรรคไทยรักไทย ไม่น้อย แต่สุดท้าย "บิ๊กจ๊อก" ก็ตัดสินใจเลือกเข้าพรรคเพื่อไทย ซึ่งเป็นพรรคการเมืองที่ถือว่าเป็น "ศัตรูหมายเลขหนึ่ง" ของกองทัพมาตลอดด้วยเหตุผลใดที่ทำให้นายทหารระดับสูงที่เคยเป็นถึงรอง ผบ.ทบ. และเคยเป็นส่วนหนึ่ง ในการ "รัฐประหาร" เมื่อครั้ง 19 กันยายน 2549 ซึ่งสมัยเจ้าตัวเป็นรองแม่ทัพภาคที่ 3 ก่อนขึ้นเป็นแม่ทัพภาคที่ 3 ต่อจาก พล.อ.สพรั่ง กัลยาณมิตร อดีตรองปลัดกลาโหมทั้งนี้ คงเป็นด้วยส่วนหนึ่งที่ พล.อ.จิรเดชมีความสนิทใกล้ชิดกับ "พ่อใหญ่จิ๋ว" ที่ถือเป็น พ่อใหญ่ที่คอยดูแลบรรดานายทหารเตรียมรุ่น 9 (ตท.9) มานาน โดยเฉพาะแกนนำ ตท.9 อย่าง "บิ๊กแป๊ะ" พล.อ.วิชิต ยาทิพย์ อดีตรอง ผบ.ทบ. ที่ถือเป็นพี่ใหญ่ในพ้องเพื่อน ตท.9ด้วยความที่ พล.อ.จิรเดชก็เป็น ตท.9 เพื่อนสนิทของ พล.อ.วิชิตเช่นกัน ทำให้การตัดสินใจ ครั้งนี้ "มันคลิกกัน" ได้ไม่ยากนักเมื่อ "เพื่อนแป๊ะ" และ "พ่อใหญ่จิ๋ว" ชักชวนมารวมกันทำพรรคเพื่อไทย ดังนั้น ไม่แปลกที่ พล.อ.จิรเดชจะตอบรับ เพราะเจ้าตัวคลุกคลีอยู่ในวงการเมืองในภาคเหนือ "ยุคทักษิณ" ไม่น้อยเช่นกันเหตุผลหนึ่ง คือ พล.อ.จิรเดชมองอนาคตการเมือง หากเลือก "พรรคแม่ธรณีบีบมวยผม" คงยากที่จะเป็นใหญ่ทางการเมืองและเจ้าตัวเคยปรารภกับ "คนใกล้ชิด" ว่า "ไม่รู้ว่าพรรคประชาธิปัตย์เขาเป็นอย่างไร ขนาดทหารบีบคอให้ยังไม่ชนะเลือกตั้ง แล้วพอมาบริหาร ประเทศก็ไม่เห็นจะมีอะไร เข้าตาประชาชน"คงด้วยเหตุผลเหล่านี้ ทำให้ พล.อ.จิรเดชตัดสินใจขอยืนฝั่งตรงข้ามกองทัพ "ยุคน้องป๊อก" พล.อ.อนุพงษ์ เผ่าจินดา ผู้บัญชาการทหารบก มาเดินเส้นทางสายการเมืองอย่างแท้จริง

SR: In addition to two top former military commanders [Chavalit and Jiradet] joining Puea Thai, the Bangkok Post reports that 20 former Class 10 classmates of Thaksin have decided to join Puea Thai, including ACM Sumeth Phomanee, former chief of staff officers at the defense ministry, Lt-Gen Jirasit Kesakomol, former commander of the First Army Corp, and Lt-Gen Manas Paorik, former deputy commander of the Third Army Area. The report also notes Puea Thai party leader Yongyuth as saying that 49 other retired military and police have joined the party. At the time of Jiradet’s induction, former deputy army commander, Wichien Rattanapirapong, a former deputy permanent interior secretary , and Pol Maj-Gen Thawat Boonfueng, a former deputy chief of Provincial Police Region 8—both Class 10—signed on with Puea Thai, according to the Bangkok Post.

In a different piece from the Bangkok Post, Veera indicates that Gen. Manoon Roopkachorn and Gen. Panlop Pinmanee, former deputy chief of the Internal Security Operations Command, are scheduled to join Puea Thai as well. Manoonkrit is from the “Young Turks” clique, Class 7, and participated in two failed coup attempts against Prem in 1981 and 1985, while Panlop, also Class 7, is similarly well-versed in coups, crackdowns, and other “black-ops”—reported Thaksin assassination plot included.

Veera, unsurprisingly, is cynical of the move by Chavalit and the other generals to join Puea Thai. Cynicism aside, the decision of these generals to side with Puea Thai represents a threat to the present power holders, otherwise why would they go out of their way to vociferously speak against it. These generals may not hold “real power” (i.e. top command positions—control of the tanks and guns) but the moves they make are highly symbolic and one shouldn’t underestimate what influence they can bring to bear even though they are retired. It also confirms, once again, that the 2006 coup leaders have still not succeeded in accomplishing their goal of destroying Thaksin and his networks—Thaksin and Puea Thai now not only have strong support from the rural electorate but also from segments of the military past and present. Certainly not everyone is content with the current power configuration. A key feature of the Thai military, historically, is class factionalism, and it would come as no surprise if we are witnessing some of this at the moment—with some of it even occurring within one class, Class 10.

How this all plays out is obviously uncertain, but one has to consider what would happen if Puea Thai wins the next election and controls government. It seems possible that this could set the stage for a direct confrontation between the military cliques aligned with Puea Thai and those aligned with the current government. With Puea Thai at the helm, would they dare contemplate purging the top military leadership and moving their own men in (this is the usual process and one of the many reasons there is a cycle of political instability), and if they did, what would the counter-reaction be? Does the Anupong Era have staying power? What makes everything more intriguing is that the political landscape could have altered greatly by the time another election is held, which could change the way high-level power plays are conducted. Looking back at some history, in May 1986, Gen. Prem, serving as PM, ousted army commander-in-chief, Gen. Arthit Kamlang-ek (a.k.a. Big Sun) and replaced him with none other than Gen. Chavalit Yongchaiyudh!

Chavalit: New Puea Thai Hand?

Media outlets are reporting that former PM Chavalit Yongchaiyudh will join Puea Thai party on the 2nd (today) at 9am (BK Post, Nation, Matichon, Thai Rath). Rumor also has it that Chavalit could take the helm as party leader (still in the air).

In a recent Twitter message, Thaksin congratulates Puea Thai on their coming together. He also says that the country's “Pu Yai” need to come together and build democracy. "ขอแสดงความยินดีกับ พรรคเพื่อไทยด้วยที่ได้พี่จิ๋วและทีมงานมาร่วมงาน ถึงเวลาแล้วครับที่ผู้ใหญ่ในบ้านเมืองต้องมาช่วยสร้างประชาธิปไตยที่แท้จริง"

Also of interest in the Matichon article, Suchart says there is a strong possibility of former national police chief, Pacharawat Wongsuwan, joining Puea Thai party because [both are from Lopburi]. He says that Prawit Wongsuwan, Pacharawat’s brother, and other military figures like Panalop Pinmanee are likely to join the party in the future. On Chavalit, Suchart says that he is a “center” that can draw people in from many sides.

“นายสุชาติกล่าวว่า มีความเป็นไปได้ที่ พล.ต.อ.พัชรวาท วงษ์สุวรรณ อดีต ผบ.ตร. จะเข้าร่วมงานกับพรรค พท.เพราะเป็นคนลพบุรี บ้านเดียวกับตน และยืนยันว่าในอนาคต พล.อ.ประวิตร วงษ์สุวรรณ รัฐมนตรีว่าการกระทรวงกลาโหม (พี่ชาย พล.ต.อ.พัชรวาท) และ พล.ต.พัชรวาท ทั้งสองคนจะมาร่วมงานกับพรรค พท.แน่นอน และอาจมีนายทหาร เช่น พล.อ.พัลลภ ปิ่นมณี รวมทั้งแกนนำพรรคร่วมรัฐบาลบางคนมาร่วมด้วยการที่ พล.อ.ชวลิตมาอยู่กับพรรค พท.นั้น เชื่อว่าจะเป็นศูนย์รวมและดึงดูดของหลายฝ่ายมาร่วม

The reporter asks Suchart whether Chavalit is switching political sides or this is for a reconciliation government. In response, Suchart [sidesteps] and says all the different sides need to talk to each other first. Suchart does propose his reconciliation formula whereby the Democrats and Puea Thai are the (1+1) leaders of the government, with premiership—ministries go to other parties—and Thaksin becomes an economic advisor to the government.

ตีปี๊บ"ประวิตร-พัชรวาท"เข้าพท. นายสุชาติกล่าวว่า มีความเป็นไปได้ที่ พล.ต.อ.พัชรวาท วงษ์สุวรรณ อดีต ผบ.ตร. จะเข้าร่วมงานกับพรรค พท.เพราะเป็นคนลพบุรี บ้านเดียวกับตน และยืนยันว่าในอนาคต พล.อ.ประวิตร วงษ์สุวรรณ รัฐมนตรีว่าการกระทรวงกลาโหม (พี่ชาย พล.ต.อ.พัชรวาท) และ พล.ต.พัชรวาท ทั้งสองคนจะมาร่วมงานกับพรรค พท.แน่นอน และอาจมีนายทหาร เช่น พล.อ.พัลลภ ปิ่นมณี รวมทั้งแกนนำพรรคร่วมรัฐบาลบางคนมาร่วมด้วย การที่ พล.อ.ชวลิตมาอยู่กับพรรค พท.นั้น เชื่อว่าจะเป็นศูนย์รวมและดึงดูดของหลายฝ่ายมาร่วม ผู้สื่อข่าวถามว่า มีกระแสข่าวถึงสาเหตุการดึง พล.อ.ชวลิต มาร่วม พท.นั้น เพื่อหวังเปลี่ยนขั้วการเมืองหรือร่วมเป็นรัฐบาลสมานฉันท์ นายสุชาติกล่าวว่า ยอมรับว่ามีแนวคิดเช่นนั้น แต่ทุกฝ่ายต้องคุยกันภายใต้แนวคิดสมานฉันท์จริงๆ โดยยึดประเทศเป็นหลัก โดยตนเสนอให้ใช้สูตรรัฐบาล 1+1 ให้พรรค ปชป. และพรรค พท.เป็นแกนนำรัฐบาล และมีนายกฯมาจากพรรค ปชป. ขณะที่การบริหารงานกระทรวงต่างๆ จะให้พรรคอื่นเข้ามาร่วม โดยที่พรรค พท.จะเสนอให้ พ.ต.ท.ทักษิณ เข้ามาเป็นที่ปรึกษาแก้ปัญหาเศรษฐกิจ

SR: Puea Thai could probably use a senior figure like Chavalit in the party right now, but as a future PM candidate, not the most appealing choice for a country trying to move into the 21st century [no personal slight on Chavalit]. Chavalit has already had his run at PM—it didn’t last very long, or end well—not to mention the even briefer stint as deputy PM in the PPP government. Chavalit's long-term prospects are also clouded by the recent NACC ruling against him and others from the PPP. Have to wait and see on this rumor of the Wongsuwan’s teaming up with Puea Thai. Pacharawat has reason to hold Abhisit and the Dem’s in contempt for the treatment he received in his last month before retirement [retire-retire or seek revenge?] On Prawit, he held relatively still through the police drama and didn’t resign—maybe a delayed maneuver here. If Prawit moves, that might shatter the supposed strong alliance between Anupong, Prawit, the Democrat government, and other “high powers”, or at least raise questions about individual alliances and loyalties. At the moment, it is all just Suchart’s speculation, which could simply be disinformation meant to sow division and discontent within the coalition government. And his reconciliation proposal/formula looks much like a non-starter.

Prem: Legacy Building

Towards the end of August, Bangkok Post reported on Gen. Prem’s wish to set up a new 3rd cavalry division for the Northeast—a plan which could take 10 years and cost tens of billions of baht.

Bangkok Post: Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda's birthday wish from last year looks as if it will come true as the army has approved the set-up of a new cavalry division to take care of the Northeast.

Army Chief Anupong Paojinda has endorsed the proposal to establish the 3rd Cavalry Division and has been pushing for cabinet approval for the plan through Defense Minister Prawit Wongsuwon, said an army source.

The 20-billion-baht plan will be presented to Gen Prem as a birthday gift on his 89th birthday party on Monday, said the source. The cavalry division set-up plan also comes as a test for the Democrat Party-led government over how much respect it has for the Privy Council president, the source said.

"I want to see the 3rd Cavalry Division before I die so that I will rest in peace," Gen Prem was quoted as saying to guests at his birthday party last year.

There are currently two cavalry divisions - the 1st Cavalry Division that oversees border areas in the North, and the 2nd Cavalry Division that takes care of the Central region and is usually the main source of forces when it comes to staging a military coup.

Given the high cost of a new cavalry division, the Abhisit Vejjajiva government is expected to approve in principle the proposal and work out the budget to fund it later, the source said. The time frame for setting up the 3rd Cavalry Division is 10 years and the costly purchase of tanks and armored personnel carriers required for the full establishment of the new division will not take place in the first five years.

Now, a month later, Bangkok Post reports that the Ministry of Defense’s screening committee has approved the plan, but it is unlikely to receive funding in the near-term because of economic conditions.

Bangkok Post: Gen Prem has made known his wish to see the division up and running in the Northeast. A Defense Ministry screening committee has approved the plan to set up the 3rd Cavalry Division as proposed by the army. The plan will be proposed to the defense minister and the cabinet, the source said.

According to the army's proposal, the establishment of the cavalry division requires a budget of 70 billion baht. However, during the first three years, the division would spend up to a billion baht to construct buildings and basic infrastructure, the source said.

The bulk of the budget will go to buying tanks.

The source said the huge budget was unlikely to be approved any time soon. It is expected the purchase of the tanks would be possible when the country's economy is in better shape, the source said. The army would soon draft up the division's organizational structure and propose it to the cabinet.

While Abhisit is Away, Cabinet Plays

Headline from KomChadLuek on the 22nd: “While Mark’s Away, the Mice Play (มาร์ค" ไม่อยู่ หนูร่าเริง)” The headline refers to the cabinet’s decision to allocate an additional 10 billion baht (US$297 million) for the Thai navy, army, SCHQ, and police, while Mark is away in New York for the UN General Assembly meeting. The proposal was spearheaded by the defense ministry, under Gen. Prawit Wongsuwan, as part of a “tie-over budget”. The following is a brief summary of the article and a breakdown of the spending. Also, there is no mention in the article as to whether there are any other veto points in the process.

Navy: The navy will first receive roughly a billion baht over three years for the purchase of Seahawk helicopters (2009:198 million; 2010: 386 million; 2011: 406 million). According to Deputy PM Spokesman, Supachai Jaisamut (BJT party), the money will be spent on Seahawk helicopters, which are noted for their anti-submarine warfighting capabilities (ASW). The helicopters will play an effective role in protecting the country’s territorial waters and protecting against enemy submarines.

The navy, in addition to the aforementioned funds, will receive upwards of 1.6 billion over three years to purchase coastal patrol vessels (2009: 314 million; 2010: 628 million; 2011: 661 million). Again, according to Supachai, the vessels are necessary for coastal patrols; protecting against illegal fishing boats; protecting natural resources in the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Sea; in addition to securing the overall peace, which includes protecting the royal family.

Army: The army will receive nearly 5 billion baht over four years, starting from 2009 to 2012 (2009-2010: 1 billion; 2011: 1.5 billion; 2012: 1.5 billion—yes, doesn’t equal five). Spending will go primarily towards replacing old and/or defective munitions and vehicles, which will include the purchase of new two and half ton, Isuzu FST 4X4 trucks.

Supreme Command HQ: The SCHQ will take on just over 3 billion baht in new funds over a period of four years (2009-10: 610 million; 2011: 814 million; 2012: 1.01 billion—yes, doesn’t equal 3). The new spending by the SCHQ will be for new vehicles and parts, replacing outdated ones.

SR: First, the breakdown for the army and SCHQ shows some “fuzzy math”—this is how it was reported in the article. There are two English language articles in the BPost and Nation—with different but similar numbers. The BPost makes note of 81 million baht going to the police for riot control gear. Overall, the bottom line is that there is a substantial allocation of new money to these different bodies.

Why the new spending?

The timing of the cabinet vote is peculiar since it occurred while Abhisit is overseas in the US. Questions arise as to whether the PM knew ahead of time about the decision or whether the cabinet, led by acting PM Suthep, decided to go behind the PM’s back and approve the measures. If Abhisit knew of the decision, and had no qualms, it indicates the PM is willing to concede to the military’s demands, either without objection or as part of some kind of horse-trading deal. In terms of PR, Abhisit will likely catch flack from the PAD for “unnecessary” spending, which will ratchet up the country’s debt. The public at large will also wonder where his government’s priorities are as the country struggles with an economic recession. It certainly does not look like effective stimulus spending given that most of the new purchases will be imports from foreign weapons manufacturers. Perhaps, Abhisit approves the measure, but thinks he can escape the negative fallout by not being in the country—shifting the blame to Suthep and the BJT.

On the other hand, there is the possibility that Suthep and the BJT decided to go behind Abhisit's back, possibly to remind him of their power and clout, or even more, to retaliate against him for trying to push Prateep over Jumpol in the appointment of the next national police chief. If this is the case, then it highlights the deep divisions between the PM and Suthep, and the PM and his coalition “ally”, the BJT. It seems the only thing holding these two warring factions together is a fear of the man in Dubai. In an interview after the cabinet meeting, Suthep denied any problems, saying the spending was not “lak gai—ลักไก่”, a trick, or literally stolen chicken. He said everything was agreed upon beforehand and scrutinized, and just a part of the normal “process”.

Lastly, questions arise as to the strategic need for helicopters to protect against enemy submarine threats. At the moment, Thailand does not face serious naval threats unless Thaksin has covertly purchased a fleet of submarines from Columbian narco-traffickers, ridiculous of course—well maybe! The navy may face a threat from China as it modernizes its navy, eventually resulting in submarines patrolling off the coast of Myanmar, but this is not an imminent security threat. Yes, defense spending is inevitable and some of it justifiable; but in this case there are real questions about timing and priorities.

The chart below comes from an article in a rogue UK magazine—Google:"Thailand's Political Army: Where the Power Lies"

Newin Case & September 19th Events

UPDATE: Newin's sources ended up proving correct: Newin and the other defendants were all found not guilty by the court, according to the Bangkok Post.

Matichon reports that Newin and his Bhum Jai Thai party are confident of a not guilty verdict in the rubber saplings corruption case, which is due on the 21st.

รายงานข่าวจากแกนนำกลุ่มเพื่อนเนวิน พรรคภูมิใจไทย (ภท.) ระบุว่า นายเนวิน ชิดชอบ หัวหน้ากลุ่มเพื่อนเนวิน จะเดินทางไปฟังคำตัดสินของศาลฎีกาแผนคดีอาญาของผู้ดำรงตำแหน่งทางการเมือง คดีทุจริตกล้ายาง ที่นายเนวินตกเป็นจำเลยด้วยในวันที่ 21 กันยายนนี้แน่นอน โดยจะมีแกนนำกลุ่มและสมาชิกพรรค ภท.ไปร่วมให้กำลังใจที่ศาลด้วย ทั้งนี้ ทุกคนในพรรคมั่นใจมาก รวมถึงนายเนวินเองก็ได้ประกาศกับคนใกล้ชิด โดยเชื่อว่าจะไม่ถูกศาลตัดสินว่าผิดแน่นอน เพราะได้รับสัญญาณมาแล้ว ทั้งนี้ ภท.เตรียมจัดงานเลี้ยงฉลองให้กับนายเนวินในเย็นวันที่ 22 กันยายน หลังการประชุมพรรค

The report notes that Newin, according to leaders from the Friends of Newin faction, will go to the Supreme Court's Criminal Division for Political Office Holders on the 21st to hear the verdict in the rubber saplings corruption case. Leaders of the BJT and party members will attend to give Newin moral support. Everyone in the BJT, including Newin, are very confident of a not guilty verdict, says the report. According to Newin, he is certain the court will not find him guilty because he has already received a signal. Accordingly, the BJT is organizing a dinner banquet on the 22nd to celebrate the Newin's victory.

SR: If found innocent, Newin will retain his position as the unofficial leader of the BJT party, though he will still have to serve out his five-year ban for his role in Thai Rak Thai. For previous analysis on the case, read here. It will be a victory of sorts for the BJT, but will leave the party subject to allegations by the reds that the decision was rigged to help the coalition government remain in power. It is interesting that Newin already knows the verdict even before it has been read. While not surprising, it seems odd after reading the Asia Foundation survey results which found the public holding a high degree of confidence in the professionalism of the courts. One wonders if the court will find the whole lot innocent or just the bigger players. If Newin's sources of information prove inaccurate, Newin will be in for a huge embarrassment on Tuesday.

On the red and yellow events on the 19th, Al Jazeera reports below, which includes an appearance by the quotemeister himself, Thitinan Pongsudhirak. Initially, it looks like the reds came out the winners, at least in terms of positive-negative PR. The yellow shirts reinforced their negative "brand image" as a group of lawless thugs, intent on stirring up trouble wherever they go. The government also comes out a loser by imposing the ISA on the reds, while leaving the yellows essentially free to run wild. Expect lots of spin in the coming days from all sides as well as a continuation of the blame game.

Update: Abhisit 9 Months Later

(Note: In the original post, Blogger had some challenges in creating the right links and spell check. These heinous crimes have been corrected. My apologies to victims of the original post)

Shortly after becoming PM, Abhisit gave numerous interviews with the international press in which he stated his major goals and objectives for the country. It is now nine months later and time to assess the progress. This assessment is based off of the three part interview Abhisit gave with CNN's Dan Rivers on December 30, 2008. In the interview, Abhisit listed his main priorities and goals as: (1) restoring Thailand's international image; (2) bringing about national reconciliation; (3) creating economic recovery; (4) welcoming back tourists and foreign investment; and (5) concluding investigations into the PAD's airport seizure.

Restoring Thailand's International Image:

Still a major work in progress. Many international observers continue to perceive Thailand as politically unstable and increasingly unmanageable. The Songkran riots in April, which forced foreign diplomats to flee the country and required the military to restore order, greatly tarnished Thailand's image internationally. The images broadcast on CNN and other major media painted a picture of a country in near total disarray and sinking fast. Just days after the rioting halted, the political situation was up-ended once more when a group of heavily armed assailants fired roughly 100 rounds into the vehicle of PAD leader, Sondhi Limthongkul, in an apparent assassination bid.

Since the Songkran riots, the government has managed to avoid a repeat disaster, but the situation remains clouded with uncertainty. In July, the government successfully hosted the ASEAN meetings in Phuket, which had been cancelled in April by the riots. The meetings, which provided a much needed positive boost to the country's image, still involved the imposition of martial law like conditions, with large numbers of military and police personnel mobilized, and the Internal Security Act (ISA), which restricts political protests, imposed throughout. The political situation, through August, remains very much heated. The government and the pro-Thaksin red shirts continue to wage tit-for-tat battles with no end in sight. The red shirts, on the back of their recent royal petition for Thaksin, planned a major rally for August 30th, but cancelled just days before due to reported difference of opinion between Thaksin and red shirt leaders. Before the cancellation, the government imposed the ISA in Bangkok's Dusit district as a precautionary security measure. At the moment, the government has decided to rescind the ISA, but says it will not hesitate to re-impose it if the red shirts rally again. The red shirt camp, meanwhile, is playing cat and mouse, keeping its future rally plans under wraps.

Abhisit's attempt to restore Thailand's international image has also faltered because of his "democratic deficits". Many foreign observers feel the current government lacks democratic legitimacy because it did not come to power straight out of a general election. Abhisit counters this by saying his appointment went through the democratic process, receiving parliamentary endorsement, but many hold a different view, seeing his ascendancy to power as the result of a backroom elite power play orchestrated by the courts, military, and shady political figures, among others.

In addition to this deficit, Abhisit has been widely criticized by the foreign media, NGOs, and others for his unwavering support of lese majeste law. Opposing groups view the law as outdated, against free speech, and subject to political manipulation, but Abhisit says it's necessary for stability. After taking office, Abhisit's ICT ministry launched an aggressive lese majeste enforcement campaign, reportedly blocking 2,300 websites in less than a month. The internationally esteemed Economist magazine has also missed the shelves on several occasions in the last eight months because of lese majeste concerns. Further ruffling international feathers, members of Foreign Correspondents Club of Thailand have become targets of lese majeste, with Laksana Kornsilpa, a translator and PAD supporter, filing lese majeste complaints against the members in July. Most recently, on August 28th, the courts handed down an 18 year prison sentence to Daranee Cherngcharnsilpakul for violating lese majeste law. In terms of reform, Abhisit hinted slightly at it in the CNN interview, but without commitment, he said, "I am open to all suggestions about changing this [lese majeste] law and any others, and I respect the rights and freedom of expression, but also I think we need to protect certain institutions be it the monarchy, be it the courts."

Thailand's image in the business community might be slightly more upbeat than elsewhere, partly because Abhisit and Korn (finance minister) are overseas educated, speak fluent English, and talk a good game. The Democrats are also perceived as a pro-business party, with competent managers. Yet, foreign direct investment figures over the last eight months suggest investors are not breaking down any doors. Also, after the Songkran riots, anecdotal evidence pointed to a crisis of confidence among foreign investors. As of September, this still appears to be the case, according to Reuters. Now, as the economy begins to recover, foreign investor sentiment should gradually improve, but remaining concerns about the unresolved political crisis will continue act as a drag on sentiment.

Creating Economic Recovery:

The government has pushed through US$44 billion in economic stimulus in order to revive confidence and stabilize demand. In recent weeks, the economy has shown signs of improvement, with indications that the recession could be over and recovery on the way. The WSJ reports the economy grew 2.3% in the second-quarter compared to a 1.8% contraction in the first quarter. It is difficult to parse out how much of the change is due to government policy vs. international factors. In general, the economy's changing fortunes have as much to do with changes in the US, China, and elsewhere, as they do with the government's stimulus spending. The WSJ article, in fact, pinpoints rising exports as a key factor in the changing growth picture. The government does deserve some credit though for getting through a stimulus package, which has probably limited the extent of the damage caused by the global economic crisis. It will also get kudos if its "Thai Kem Kaeng" projects improve growth and competitiveness. Whether Thai Kem Kaeng is the real deal or just another hastily put together piece of political pork remains to be seen.

From a political angle, the agriculture sector, which still employs more than 50% of the population, continues to take a beating, which could make things more difficult for the Democrats in pro-PPP areas. In recent months, there have been a number of squabbles between farmers and the commerce ministry over the government's handling of agriculture policy, particulary its crop mortgage and price support schemes. In the latest July BOT report, agricultural income, production, and prices, still showed significant year-on-year contraction, though less so than in June. Also of interest, agriculture export growth (in terms of US$) hit -42.8% in July (y/y), compared to -34.3% in June. Part of this problem could be Vietnam's lower rice prices, which according to Ponnarong Prasertsri, an agricultural specialist at the US Embassy in Bangkok, is dampening Thai exports.

Welcoming Back Tourists and Foreign Investment

Tourism: In his CNN interview, Abhisit said, "It will be safe", speaking to tourists who plan to visit Thailand. By in large, the country is still safe for those travelers who don't hang out around political rallies or engage in activities that contravene Thai law. Some visitors will have trouble with con-artists and their own personal mis-steps, but this has always been the case. However, actual safety vs. perceptions and managing image are different ball of wax. Recent reports concerning the King Power, duty-free, racket, which targets travelers at the international airport, have raised safety concerns among some international travelers. Additionally, it highlights how troubles with even just a few tourists can negatively affect the country's image, thanks to the speed and reach of the Internet. Overall, the Songkran riots, the earlier airport seizure by the PAD, general political uncertainty, and H1N1, continue to weigh negatively on tourists' perceptions of Thailand.

In terms of numbers, there has been a marked decline in arrivals over the last year, falling 16.35 % year-on-year through the 2nd quarter. Full tourism statistics, up to July, are provided by the BoT. The fall off, it should be noted, began in the second-half of 2008, when the current government was not in power. In addition, Thailand's regional peers like Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam, have suffered similar year-on-year declines during the same period. The global economic crisis and H1N1 certainly account for much of the drop off in tourism, but it doesn't mean domestic political troubles aren't also to blame. For Abhsit, he has laid out the welcome mat, but the tourists have yet to fully respond. In the recent July reporting by the BoT, tourism arrivals rose 1.4% (m/m), but this doesn't indicate a major turnaround. Moreover, looking at seasonal fluctuations from 2006-8, it is typical for arrivals to increase from June to July. Moving forward, the situation should improve, in line with growth of the global economy, but getting a full return to the "Land of Smiles" will depend a great deal on how the government manages the political situation and its international image—both are obviously closely linked.

Foreign Direct Investment: Foreign direct investment has not improved in the eight months since Abhisit took office, though as with tourism, FDI started falling in 2008 when the global economy entered into crisis. In 2008, the year prior to Abhsit taking office, net FDI to Thailand dropped by 12.5% to $9.8 billion. Despite the drop, Thailand still ranked second regionally, behind Singapore, in terms of FDI inflows. Among its other regional peers in 2008, Singapore received roughly $23 billion, Malaysia $8.05 billion, Vietnam $8.05 billion, Indonesia $7.9 billion, and the Philippines $1.5 billion. Looking at this year, from January to July, the BoI, reports total foreign registered capital at 11.8 billion baht, falling from 27.1 billion baht from the same period last year. The BoI also reports the number of 100% foreign owned projects from January to July at 182, down from 261 from the same period last year. Lastly, the BOI reports that total investment in 100% foreign owned projects at 21.7 billion baht (Jan-Jul), compared to 85.4 billion baht last year (Jan-Jul). Again, it is difficult to parse how much of the decline in FDI this year is due to global economic conditions, domestic political instability, government policy, and other factors. Certainly Abhisit doesn't deserve to take all the blame for the FDI situation, but he must accept some of it (i.e. for factors like political instability and government policy).

Concluding the PAD Investigation:

Everyone remembers late August of 2008 when the PAD launched its "final war" against the PPP government, seizing control of Government House and breaking into the NBT and other state offices. After taking control over Government House, the PAD broadened its war by raiding the tarmac of the Phuket airport and blocking the entrance to Krabi and Hat Yai airports. Months later, in November, the PAD upped the ante and took control of the Suvarnabhumi international airport and the older Don Muang airport. The PPP goverment, led by Somchai Wongsawat, fell just days after when the courts dissolved the PPP party for election law violations in the December 2007 poll. The collapse of the PPP-led government created a vaccuum, which allowed Abhisit and his Democrat party to form a new coalition government with the PPP's former partners and a faction from within the PPP.

When Abhisit took over as PM in December, the PAD leaders who had organized the Government House and airport seizures had yet to be prosecuted. One of Abhisit's first moves a PM was to appoint PAD supporter Kasit Piromya as his foreign minister. Kasit attended the airport rally and gave moral backing and encouragement to the PAD's cause. On dealing with the PAD's transgressions, Abhisit told CNN, "Yes, I think that should be done [investigation into how the PAD seized the airports so easily] and my idea is that not only should the police do its job but the Human Rights Commission should provide an overview of all the political movements."

After eight months, the top five PAD leaders accused of organizing the various seizures of state property remain free, including foreign minister Kasit. Within the legal system, there are reportedly a number of cases floating around that could eventually bring some conclusion to these incidents. In mid-July, a number of the high-profile PAD leaders were given summons, requesting them to appear before the police to hear criminal charges relating to the airport seizures. All of the PAD leaders, unsurprisingly, rejected the charges. Kasit has even filed a petition asking police to review and drop the charges; set up a committee to probe investigators handling the case; and temporarily halt the investigation. As for the Government House incident, the public prosecution earlier postponed its decision on whether to indict nine of the PAD leaders. According to the Bangkok Post, the prosecution will make its decision on September 10.

Seeing a successful conclusion to these cases, which means the PAD leaders are prosecuted and penalized, is essential if Abhisit hopes to dispel the perception that he is a double-talker, a man of double-standards, and a PAD lackey. It is also important for Thailand's international image—international investors and tourists want to know that the rule of law is taken seriously in Thailand. And more obviously, they want to know that their vacations won't be ruined or their goods left to rot on loading decks because an army of political zealots doesn't like the government. Politically, it may serve Abhisit well to do away with the PAD since they now have a political party that could siphon off votes in the next election, though doing so would involve a direct confrontation, something Abhisit can ill afford given his precarious position at the moment. In addition, Abhisit may need to keep the PAD option alive just in case his party is unable to prevail at the next election.

The mid-term exam has been tough for Abhisit, but he still has finals and the class project to try and boost his grade. To be fair, a PPP-led government run by Chalerm or a Shinawatra family member would probably not fair much better, given the challenge it would face from the PAD and the triumverate.

On a different level, does anyone think there are "legacy concerns" from a certain corner of the realm that may just decide to jump in at the last moment and completely flip the script?